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MANSON v. BRATHWAITE: LOOKING FOR THE
SILVER LINING IN THE AREA OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS
Eyewitness identifications are important in criminal prosecutions be-
cause they can lend certainty in cases which might otherwise depend upon
weak circumstantial evidence.' The reliability of identification testimony,
however, is inherently suspect since it is based upon the perception of
witnesses who may have been frightened or confused by the criminal act
they observed. 2 Although courts traditionally ruled that all eyewitness
identifications would be admissible and allowed the defense to attack only
the weight of the evidence,3 in 1967 the Supreme Court established guide-
lines for the admissibility of identification testimony at trial.4 Under these
guidelines the prosecution would have to prove that the witness had a
sufficient opportunity to view the criminal act at the time of the crime'
and that nothing that occurred between the crime and the witness' testi-
mony would have rendered the identification unreliable.'
One event occurring between the crime and the trial, and over which
the government has exclusive control, is the identification procedure,
which may include a lineup,7 showup,8 or photographic display During
the past decade, the Supreme Court has regulated these procedures by
requiring exclusion of any testimony that might have been based upon
such violations of thi defendant's due process rights as unnecessary
suggestiveness of the procedures" and lack of counsel at post-indictment
I P. WALL, EYEwITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
WALL].
2 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977). See generally N. SOBEL, EYEwrrNEss
IDENTIFCATION § 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SOBEL,]; Buckout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231
Scientific American 23-31 (Dec. 1974); Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades-I,
1963 CRiM. L. REv. 479, 482.
3 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1967); see, e.g., United States v. Denno, 355
F.2d 731, 735-36 (1966) and cases cited therein.
The Supreme Court's first comprehensive approach to the admissibility of eyewitness
identification was in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See also Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See text accompanying notes
26-41 infra.
5 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); see text accompanying notes 26-29
infra.
I See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967). An eyewitness identification which
may have been reliable shortly after the crime may become questionable after the passage of
time simply because the witness' memory may fade. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 241 (1967). In addition, an intervening suggestive identification procedure may render
an identification unreliable. See id. at 235. See also SOBEL, supra note 2, at §§ 3, 3.01.
See SOBEL, supra note 2, at § 40; WALL, supra note 1, at 40-64.
8 In a showup, a single suspect is shown to the eyewitness. See SOBEL, supra note 2, at §
39; WALL, supra note 1, at 27-40. See generally note 32 infra.
I A photographic display may be conducted like a showup, showing single pictures, or
like a lineup, with multiple pictures. See generally SOBEL, supra note 2, at §§ 45-51; WALL,
supra note 1, at 66-89.
,0 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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identifications." Recently, however, in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Su-
preme Court perfected a due process rule which emphasizes the reliability
of the identification over the suggestiveness of the procedures, holding that
exclusion of identification testimony should occur only when the unneces-
sary suggestiveness of the procedure might have rendered the witness'
identifications unreliable. 3
The identifications challenged in Brathwaite were offered by an under-
cover narcotics agent who had described his drug supplier to a uni-
formed policeman." The policeman, thinking he recognized the descrip-
tion, procured a photograph of the defendant and left it in the agent's
office. 5 Subsequently, the agent looked at the picture and concluded that
the man pictured was the one who had previously sold him the narcotics.'
At trial, the picture was received as evidence of the agent's out-of-court
identification of the defendant. 7 In addition, the agent made an in-court
identification of the defendant. 8 All identification testimony was admitted
and the defendant was convicted of possession and sale of narcotics."
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court held that
any reliable identification is admissible, even if the witness was involved
in an unnecessarily, impermissibly suggestive identification procedure."0
Reliability must be determined, the Brathwaite Court said, by weighing
the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of any description of the criminal
given by the witness before the identification proceeding, the witness' cer-
tainty in identifying the criminal, and the time elapsed between the crime
and confrontation, against the corrupting influence of the suggestive proce-
dure.' If a court concludes that the corrupting effects of the suggestive
procedure outweigh the indications of reliability, then the identification
testimony should be excluded.2 The test of admissibility as stated by the
" United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
12 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
" Id. at 114.
" Id. at 101.
I d.
I6 d.
17 Id. at 102.
"s Id.
"1 After Brathwaite's conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, State
v. Brathwaite, 164 Conn. 617, 325 A.2d 284 (1973), the federal district court denied the
defendant's petition for habeas corpus. 432 U.S. at 103. The appeals court reversed, holding
that all of the identification testimony should be excluded because it was the product of an
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. 527 F.2d 363, 366-71 (2d Cir. 1975).
1 432 U.S. at 116-17. The Brathwaite Court did not find the identification procedures
to be suggestive. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
1, 432 U.S. at 114. The Supreme Court's wording of the due process right protected by
the Brathwaite test appears in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). "[D]ue process protects
the accused against the introduction of evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifi-
cations obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures." Id. at 227; see note 8 supra.
See 432 U.S. at 116-17. Although the Brathwaite Court did not mention due process
issues in its holding, id. at 114-17, it did say that due process was not violated unless, under
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Brathwaite Court arose primarily from the earlier Supreme Court cases of
United States v. Wade,2 Stovall v. Denno,
2' and Neil v. Biggers. 2
The reliability element of the Brathwaite test came almost verbatim
from Wade,2 in which a lineup identification was held in the absence of
defense counsel.Y The Wade Court held that a witness could identify the
the "totality of the circumstances," the suggestive procedures led to a "substantial likelihood
of misidentification." Id. at 106, quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 201 (1972); see
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967). A defendant would be denied due process of
law when, "under the totality of circumstances" the "confrontation. . . was. . . unnecessar-
ily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification." 388 U.S. at 301-02; accord
Allen v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978.)
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
24 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
2 388 U.S. at 240-41.
2 Id. at 219-20. The sixth amendment right to counsel was applied to states via the
fourteenth amendment by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Wade Court
concluded that identification proceedings present a myriad of opportunities for abuse and
mistake, necessitating the presence of defense counsel. 388 U.S. at 235-36. The Court ruled
that the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage at which Wade was entitled to the
presence of counsel. Id. at 237. At the time Wade was decided, the right to counsel was
thought to be the best protection against suggestive identification procedures. See Recent
Developments, Identification: Unnecessary Suggestiveness May Not Violate Due Process, 73
COLUM. L. Rav. 1168, 1169-70 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Identification].
In Wade, the Supreme Court called for legislation that would clearly establish the ac-
cused's right to counsel, 388 U.S. at 239, and denied that its decision was meant to limit the
legislature. Id. Congress' response to Wade was § 701(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1976). Section 3502 made the identification
testimony of eyewitnesses unconditionally admissible. It was an attempt to nullify the rights
granted in Wade by statutorily removing any requirement for counsel or for reliability, thus
allowing the prosecution to present all identification testimony. S. REP. No. 1097,90th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2139; see Levine & Tapp,
'The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 1079, 1084 n.29 (1973) (suggesting that § 3502 is unconstitutional). Nevertheless, most
courts have ignored the statute and followed Wade's interpretation of due process. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sutherland, 428 F. 2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. King, 321 F.
Supp. 614 (W.D. Tex. 1970). See also McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal
Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 249-50 (1970); Recent Statute, 82 HARV. L. Rv.
1392 (1969).
In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
during identification proceedings arises only after the defendant has been formally charged.
Id. at 691; see Grano; Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent? 72 MICH. L. Rav. 719 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutional Safeguards]. Kirby was clarified recently in Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220 (1977), where a witness testified as to an out-of-court identification that had taken
place at a preliminary hearing. Defense counsel was present at the hearing. Id. at 223-24. The
Moore Court held that it is not the indictment that triggers a right to counsel in identification
cases, but "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. at 226,
quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). There is a suggestion in Moore that the
rule requiring exclusion where defense counsel is not present will give way to a rule which
will ignore the right to counsel and concentrate upon the reliability of the identification. 434
U.S. at 229-30, (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
19781
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defendant in court despite the existence of this tainted pretrial identifica-
tion." Such an in-court identification, in order to be admissible, however,
must have some reliable basis independent of the tainted proceedings.
Specifically, the Court required adequate observation at the time of the
crime. 9
The suggestiveness element of the Brathwaite test10 came from
Stovall,31 in which the defendant had been taken to a stabbing victim's
hospital room for a showup identification 2 because the police feared the
victim would die before she had an opportunity to view the suspect.3 The
Supreme Court held that the "totality of circumstances ' 34 indicated that
the suggestiveness was the product of necessity,35 and not of police indiffer-
ence to constitutional rights of the defendant. Testimony as to the out-of-
court identification 3 was therefore held admissible, because the procedure
21 388 U.S. at 240-41.
Id. The policy of allowing the prosecution to prove that evidence improperly acquired
ultimately would have been acquired legally arose in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963). In Wong Sun, the Court affirmed the prosecutor's introduction of a confession
which was obtained after the suspect, who had been arrested, returned several days later to
confess. Id. at 491. In accord with Wong Sun, the Wade Court held that the identification
testimony, though acquired under improper circumstances, would have been acquired in any
case because the witness' identification was reliable. 388 U.S. at 240. Thus, the evidence was
admissible because improperly obtained evidence can be "purged of the primary taint." 388
U.S. at 241, citing MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
0 432 U.S. at 114; see text accompanying note f3 supra.
11 388 U.S. at 301-02.
2 See note 8 supra. Showup identifications like those in Stovall and Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188 (1972) are recognized as being inferior to proper lineups and are presumed to be
suggestive. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), citing WALL, supra note 1, at 24-60;
Paul, Identification of Accused Persons, 12 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 42, 44 (1938); Williams & Ham-
melmann, Identification Parades-I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479, 480-81; F. FRANKFURTER, THE
CASE OF SACCO AND VANZErI 31-32. Under Stovall, testimony as to unnecessarily suggestive
out-of-court identifications is inadmissible. 388 U.S. at 301-02. See text accompanying notes
31-37 supra.
3 388 U.S. at 295.
3 Id. at 302. The Stovall Court used "totality of circumstances" in reference to the
necessity and suggestiveness of the confrontation "[A] claimed violation of due process of
law in the conduct of a confrontation, depends on the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing it. . . ." Id. The only facts discussed in the Court's due process analysis related to the
showup procedure itself. Id. Reliability had no part in the Stovall Court's totality of the
circumstances test. See id. In later cases, however, the totality test was expanded to compre-
hend reliability. See note 46 infra.
" 388 U.S. at 302.
11 In-court testimony as to an out-of-court identification technically is hearsay. It is an
out-of-court statement offered to prove that the man identified earlier was the criminal. See
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967); WALL, supra note 1, at 134-40. State courts
have been divided concerning the admissibility of this testimony. WALL, supra note 1, at 134;
see cases collected in 71 A.L.R. 2d 449. Congress, noting the split, amended FEDERAL RULE.
OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1) to include 801(d)(1)(C), which provides that a prior statement by a
witness is not hearsay if "The declarant testifies at a trial or a hearing and is subject to
cross-examination . . . and the statement is . . .one of identification made after perceiving
him .. " FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C).
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was neither improper nor violative of the defendant's due process rights."
Together, Wade and Stovall established rules to be applied by courts
faced with identification testimony based upon suggestive police proce-
dures.3 An in-court identification would be admissible if it had a reliable
basis independent of the tainted proceeding.39 An out-of-court identifica-
tion would be admissible if the identification procedure had not, by its
unnecessary suggestiveness, violated the defendant's due process rights.,
If the procedures had been unnecessarily suggestive, or if they were con-
ducted without defense counsel present, the testimony would be excluded
and the prosecution would have no opportunity to prove reliability.'
Although Wade and Stovall drew a clear distinction between in-court
and out-of-court identification," Neil v. Biggers13 subsequently erased that
distinction by holding that all identification testimony should be judged
according to a Wade-type reliability standard." The Biggers Court con-
cluded that in- and out-of-court identification should be admitted into
evidence if there are sufficient indicia of reliability.45 If, under the totality
of the circumstances,46 an identification seems reliable, admission of that
388 U.S. at 302.
Wade and Stovall belong to a trio of cases, the Wade Trilogy, which embodied the
Warren Court's attitude toward identification testimony. The third case, Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), involved a doubly tainted lineup procedure. First, the lineup was
suggestive because approximately one hundred witnessses were in the audience and no effort
was made to keep them from influencing each other. Id. at 270-71 n.2. The Court, however,
required the exclusion of the identification testimony because the post-indictment proceeding
was conducted without defense counsel present. Id. at 272. Gilbert established the exclusion-
ary rule as the proper handling of testimony as to identification obtained at tainted pretrial
proceedings. Id. at 273.
", United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 (1967).
0 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
" Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
' See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
a 409 U.S. 188 (1972). In Biggers, a rape victim who had viewed many suspects over the
course of seven months finally identified the defendant at a showup. She testified in court as
to the previous identification, id. at 194-95, but did not identify the defendant there. It
appears that she was not asked to make an in-court identification.
" 409 U.S. at 199-200. The Biggers test of reliability of the identification is similar to
the Wade independent basis criteria. 388 U.S. at 241. While the Wade criteria are elements
of an admissibility test and the Biggers criteria are elements of a due process test, the
distinction may be blurred, and "independent basis" and "reliability" are probably inter-
changeable. See SOBEL, supra note 2, at § 70 (1978 Supp.)
A subtle difference between the Wade and the Biggers tests illustrates the shift of the
Supreme Court's emphasis from the suggestiveness of the procedure to the reliability of the
identification. Wade gives no credence to an identification simply because the witness claims
to be certain, but instead discredits his testimony if there are any misidentifications. 388 U.S.
at 240. Biggers, on the other hand, might overlook some suggestiveness if the witness claims
to be certain, 409 U.S. at 199, and therefore, might ignore misidentifications. See id. at 199-
200.
'5 Id.
48 Id. at 199. Although the Biggers Court appears to have applied the totality of circum-
stances test from Stovall, 409 U.S. at 196, 199, in fact, the Biggers test is different, since
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testimony will not violate due process despite the unnecessary suggestive-
ness of the procedure."
Biggers was criticized by some commentators who felt that the Su-
preme Court had tampered with the concept of due process by focussing
on the reliability of the identification while ignoring the unnecessary
suggestiveness of the procedure by which the identification was obtained.48
More important to lower courts, though, the decision was ambiguous as to
the proper application of the new reliability test. The crime, identification,
and conviction in Biggers all took place before Stovall was decided,49 and
the Biggers Court did not state clearly whether its test was to be applied
in all cases or only in those situations similar to Biggers where the proce-
dure in question occurred prior to the announcement of Stovall's per se
exclusionary rule." Biggers held that a pre-Stovall case should not be
subject to the strict exclusionary rule based upon suggestiveness. 5' How-
ever, courts applying Biggers were unsure whether to use the Biggers relia-
bility test only in pre-Stoval5 2 cases or in all cases.13 This ambiguity was
Stovall looked only to the suggestiveness of the procedure. 388 U.S. at 302; see note 34 supra.
See also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 123-24 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 409 U.S. at 199. The American Law Institute reasoned that Biggers applied Wade's
admissibility test rather than Stovall's due process test because the Biggers Court did not
want to analyze the due process issue closely. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDUE
§ 160, General Comment at 421 (1975). Feeling that the Court's action in Biggers was an
invitation to generate a code of procedures that would reduce the necessity of having a lawyer
present at identification proceedings, the Institute accepted § 160 of the MODEL CODE.
11 See Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 27, at 720-21; Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers:
The Supreme Court Dismantles The Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 1097, 1098-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pulaski]; Identification, supra note 27, at
1181. Biggers was criticized because of its shift away from suggestiveness which took the
burden off the prosecution to conduct a scrupulously fair identification procedure, and im-
posed upon the defense the burden of proving that an identification was not reliable. See
Pulaski, supra this note, at 112. Another danger of using an independent basis test as a test
of due process is that courts must look to factors external to the procedure itself to decide if
due process has been violated. United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Zelker, 477 F.2d 797, 804
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom Gonzalez v. Vincent, 414 U.S. 924 (1974) (circumstantial
evidence of guilt used to corroborate identification and establish no due process violation);
State v. James, 217 Kan. 96, 535 P.2d 991 (1975) (previous uncharged acts of bizarre sexual
nature admitted to corroborate identification). See generally SOBEL, supra note 2, 1978
Supp. at 73-74.
, Archie Biggers was charged with a rape that occurred on August 17, 1965. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee affirmed the conviction on Jan. 12, 1967, Biggers v. State, 219 Tenn. 553,
411 S.W.2d 696 (1967), seven months before Stovall was decided. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the state court decision by an equally divided court. Biggers v. Tennessee,
390 U.S. 404 (1968). A decision by an equally divided Court is not considered a final adjudica-
tion within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970), which prohibits habeas hearings on
cases already adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, Biggers was
allowed to attack the state decision collaterally by means of a habeas petition that was
granted by the federal district and circuit courts. Biggers v. Neil, 448 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1971).
The Supreme Court did not finally rule on the case until seven years after the crime was
committed. 409 U.S. at 201.
1 409 U.S. at 199.
Id.
52 See Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1976); Brathwaite v. Manson, 527
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the primary issue to be decided by the Brathwaite Court.54
Although the Brathwaite Court specifically stated the Biggers "totality
of the circumstances" analysis" would be applied to both pre- and post-
Stovall cases,5" the Court nevertheless modified that analysis, requiring
courts to consider the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.57 In
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized the existence of two rules: a
per se exclusionary rule based upon Stovall5 and a due process exclusion-
ary rule arising from Wade and Biggers." The Brathwaite Court compared
the efficacy of the two rules. First, the Court noted that although both rules
promote reliability of identification, the per se exclusionary rule could
prevent reliable testimony from reaching the trier of fact." Second, the
Court considered deterrence of improper police procedure and concluded
that while the per se exclusionary rule was a more effective deterrent, the
due process exclusionary rule was not powerless to deter police from sub-
jecting suspects to unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures."
Finally, the effect on judicial administration was seen by the Court as one
of the best reasons for adopting a due process rule." Not only would the
per se rule deprive the trier of fact of valuable," reliable evidence, it would,
because of its rigidity, make judicial error more likely than a due process
approach, which allows the trial judge to examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances. 4
F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1975);- Smith v.
Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Wallace v. Smith, 414 U.S. 1115
(1973).
&I United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 407-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1016 (1975); Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stanley
v. Slayton, 416 U.S. 958 (1973).
u 432 U.S. at 107.
" 409 U.S. at 199-200; see text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
" 432 U.S. at 114.
S7 Id.
5' See note 52 supra.
51 See note 53 supra. The Biggers Court was sensitive to the difference between a per se
exclusionary rule like Stovall's, which would automatically exclude evidence if the identifica-
tion process were proved unnecessarily suggestive, and a due process exclusionary rule which
was also stated in Stovall: "[The pretrial confrontation conducted in this case was so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the de-
fendant] was denied due process of law." 388 U.S. at 301-02. See generally SOBEL, supra note
2, at §§ 8-9.
432 U.S. at 112.
*I Id. Because the per se rule requires the automatic exclusion of any testimony as to an
improper identification procedure, it seems police departments would recognize that such
procedures would be a wasted effort and would avoid them. On the other hand, while the due
process rule may allow the use of identifications obtained at improper proceedings, the worst
abuses would still be excluded and police departments would have to be alert to the danger
of excessive suggestiveness. Thus, both rules can potentially prevent police misconduct.
11 Id. at 112-13.
6' Id.
" Presumably, the Brathwaite Court meant that a totality of circumstances test will
result in fewer judicial errors than a per se test because the totality test allows more pertinent
evidence to be admitted. On the other hand, the Court might have meant that the more
19781 1085
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The Brathwaite Court concluded that the reliability of an identification
must be the "linchpin" in analyzing the admissibility of identification
testimony in all cases, pre- and post-Stovall.5 In setting forth the totality
of circumstances test, however, the Brathwaite Court did not abandon the
Stovall suggestiveness test66 as the Biggers Court had done.17 Where
Biggers had ruled simply that the reliable identification would be admissi-
ble, Brathwaite ruled that reliability must be weighed against the
"corrupting effect of the suggestive identification."6
The Brathwaite Court's totality of circumstances test of due process
appears to be more comprehensive than the due process tests of Stovall
and Biggers.69 Prudently applied, the test should protect the defendant
from an identification procedure that is "unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable misidentification, '' 7° and at the same time allow
reliable testimony to be presented. The Brathwaite Court's application of
the test is exemplary. There must be an examination of each reliability
criterion, seriatim, accompanied by an analysis of the suggestiveness of the
procedure.
71
Although the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the totality of the
circumstances in Brathwaite, it did not explicitly mandate such a full
treatment for future cases. Thus, situations may arise in which a court
would accept a characterization of the facts that supports a finding of
flexible totality of circumstances rule could help prevent procedural errors in the admission
and exclusion of evidence. The latter interpretation is illogical, however, in that a strict rule,
because of its rigidity, does not leave much room for error, while a flexible rule is open to
many erroneous interpretations.
0 432 U.S. at 117.
" Id. at 114. The Stovall suggestiveness test is discussed in the text accompanying notes
35-38 supra.
" The totality of circumstances test set forth in Biggers does not take the suggestiveness
of the identification into account. 409 U.S. at 199-200. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see notes 34, 46 supra.
" 432 U.S. at 114.
" Id. at 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, while criticizing the majority's
retreat from the per se exclusionary rule, id. at 118-29, praises the majority's revival of the
Stoval test of suggestiveness, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); see text accompanying
notes 31-41 supra, that had been ignored in Biggers. See note 67 supra.
10 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). The language quoted in the accompanying
text has become the due process standard by which out-of-court identification procedures are
measured. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). Equivalent language is sometimes substi-
tuted. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) ("very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification"). With the word "irreparable" deleted, the Stovall language
becomes the standard for admissibility of testimony as to tainted out-of-court identifications.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
11 432 U.S. at 114-17. Several cases decided subsequent to Brathwaite have been in close
accord with the Supreme Court's thorough analysis. Some have concluded that the identifica-
tion testimony is admissible. Allen v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 732 (1978); United States v.
Collins, 559 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. McNair, 439 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1977). Other cases, after full analysis, have decided that the identification testimony must
be excluded. United States v. Mann, 557 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Thacker v. South Caro-
lina, 438 F. Supp. 447 (D.S.C. 1977).
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reliability" and then either decide that no amount of suggestiveness can
outweigh reliability, 3 or ignore the suggestiveness.7' In addition, a court,
convinced that it need not test reliability unless suggestiveness is proven,
might accept a weak demonstration of the propriety of the procedure and
never examine reliability at all.75 Both of these approaches seem incorrect
in light of the care taken by the Brathwaite Court to apply each element
of the test.
7 6
Although the Brathwaite Court stated that the only question under
consideration was whether Biggers should apply only to pre-Stovall cases
or to all cases,7 7 it may ultimately be more important that Brathwaite
abandoned the per se exclusionary rule propounded in Stovall"s and modi-
fied the Biggers formulation of the due process exclusionary test." Because
it requires a consideration of the suggestiveness of the identification proce-
dure in addition to an evaluation of the reliability of the identification,
Brathwaite recognizes that a due process test must consider procedure.
Brathwaite will be judged harshly by advocates of per se exclusionary
rules. Nevertheless, the majority's decision explicitly weighed the dangers
of misidentification against the evil of excluding valid evidence." The
augmented test of reliability8 ' was the Court's response to the fear that
misidentification arising from suggestive procedure can put the wrong man
on trial.2 While Brathwaite does not require that identifications based
upon unnecessarily suggestive procedures be automatically excluded, it
does give a criminal defendant an opportunity to have the suggestiveness
of the procedure scrutinized, and a chance to get the identification ex-
cluded on the basis of its suggestiveness.8
W. RKER PURCELL
7 Compare Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 200-01 (1972) with Biggers v. Neil, 448 F.2d
91, 93 (6th Cir. 1971). Compare Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977) with
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 129-36 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) and Brathwaite
v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1975).
I See, e.g., McGuff v. Alabama, 566 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1978). In McGuff witnesses to a
murder based their identifications upon their view of the murderer as he drove by, shouted
an obscenity, stuck a gun out the window and fired. Id. at 940. The next morning, the police
picked up the defendant and drove him to each witness' house. During this identification
procedure, the defendant never got out of the police car. Id. All identifications were admitted
and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 940-41.
74 Cf. United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977)(good factual basis existed for finding of reliability, but court didnot balance reliability
against suggestiveness); United States v. Ivory, 563 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1977)(facts strongly
supported finding of reliability, but court did not balance reliability against suggestiveness).
Is See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1977). Although Lewis was
decided after Brathwaite, the court did not refer to Brathwaite, possibly explaining the
court's failure to examine reliability where the identification procedure was challenged.
76 432 U.S. at 114-17.
7 Id. at 107; see note 54 supra.
11 432 U.S. at 118-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 111-14.
Id. at 114.
2 See generally Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 27, at 719-25.
93 432 U.S. at 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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